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CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER.
Melville Weston Fuller was born at Augusta, Maine, on
February iith, 1833. His father and his father's father
are said to have been able lawyers, and his mother's father,
Nathan Weston, was for twenty-one years a member of the
Supreme Court of Maine. Two of his uncles also were
engaged in the active practice of law. He studied in the
office of one of those uncles, George Melville Weston, at
Bangor, from his graduation from Bowdoin College in
1853 until 1855, in the meanwhile also attending a course
of lectures at the Harvard Law School. He then began the
practice of law in Augusta as the partner of another uncle,
Benjamin A. G. Fuller. Before the end of 1856, however,
he moved to Chicago. He there took an active part in
public affairs and was elected to the state legislature and to
a constitutional convention.
It is recorded that he was of counsel in the first case
which was heard by the United States Supreme Court after
Chief justice Waite entered upon his duties as presiding
officer of that court,' that that was not his first appearance
Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, (1874) ig Wall. 49o; see
also p. iii of that volume.
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in the court of last resort, and that it was far from being
the last occasion on which he argued before that august
tribunal.2 Indeed, in a number of cases which were heard
by the court after his own appointment to the Chief Jus-
ticeship he had been of counsel and for that reason did not
participate in the decision. 8
He was appointed Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court by President Cleveland in 1888 and took
his seat upon the bench in October of that year, where he
served until his death at Sorrento, Maine, on July 4th, 191o.
During the twenty-two years in which he held that im-
portant office he took part in the decision of almost every
question which came before the court. He himself was
called upon to announce the judgment in no less than eight
hundred and thirty-two cases, and in most of those cases he
accompanied the announcement with a carefully prepared
opinion. He also in thirty-one cases both dissented from
the position taken by the court and stated the reasons for
his dissent.
4
'The statements here made as to Mr. Fuller's ancestry and his
career before his appointment to the Chief Justiceship are based upon
an article at the beginning of the first volume of The Green Bag
(1889). The statements as to his subsequent career are based upon
a page by page examination of the reports.
'This was true in Cleaveland v. Richardson, (1889) 132 U. S. 318,
io Sup. Ct. ioo; Elwellv. Fosdick, (189o) 134 U. S. 5oo, io Sup. Ct.
598; Union Bank of Chicago v. Kansas City Bank, (189o) 136 U. S.
223, 10 Sup. Ct. 1o13; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Hoyt, (1893)
149 U. S. I, 13 Sup. Ct 779; North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St.
Louis Ore & Steel Co., (1894) 152 U. S. 596, 14 Sup. Ct. 710; United
States v. Illinois C. R. Co., (1894) 154 U. S. 225, 14 Sup. Ct. lO15;
Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co.,
(1894) 155 U. S. 156, 15 Sup. Ct. 42; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois,
(1892) 146 U. S. 387, 13 Sup. Ct 110; Illinois v. Illinois C. R. Co.,
(902) 184 t. S. 77, 22 Sup. Ct. 300.
' He dissented one hundred and twenty-nine times from the de-
cision of the court and also dissented in part twice. He expressed his
concurrence with the result reached seven times. In seventy-one
cases one or more justices dissented from decisions announced by him
and in three additional cases other justices dissented in part In eight
cases other justices expressed concurrence and once also a concurrence
in part was expressed. The Chief Justice on December iIth, i889,
delivered before the two houses of Congress an address on The In-
CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER
His opinions cover a wide range of subjects. Many of
them, of course, relate to constitutional law, but most of
them do not. They concern, many of them, simply the
jurisdiction of the court. There are cases in which the
admiralty jurisdiction of the court has been invoked. 5
There are a number of prize cases arising out of our war
with Spain." The cases deal with the interpretation of the
anti-trust act 7 and the tariff8 and patent and bankruptcy laws
and other federal statutes. They include cases on state law
in which the federal courts acquired jurisdiction by reason
of the diverse citizenship of the parties. And they deal with
controversies between states.9 Of this vast multitude of
auguration of Washington, which is printed as an appendix to 132 U. S.
In Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, (1898) 169 U. S. 398, I8 Sup. Ct.
396, and in Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, (igo9) 214 U. S. 19,
29 Sup. Ct. 6oi, he took no part in the decision, doubtless because he
was ex officio a regent of that institution.
' See, for example, Cleveland T. & V. R. Co. v. Cleveland Steam-
ship Co., (i9o8) 2o8 U. S. 316, 28 Sup. Ct. 414; International Nay.
Co. v. Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co., (igoi) 181 U. S. 218, 21 Sup. Ct. 591;
Oregon R. & Nay. Co. v. Balfour, (i9oo) 179 U S. 55, 21 Sup. Ct.
28; Smith v. Burnett, (1899) 173 U. S. 430, 19 Sup. Ct. 442; Rea v. The
Eclipse, (1890) 135 U. S. 599, io Sup. Ct. 873.
sSee, for example, The Manila Prize Cases, (1903) 188 U. S. 254,
23 Sup. Ct. 415; The Infanta Maria Teresa, (19o3) i88 U. S. 283, 23
Sup. Ct. 412; The Carlos F. Roses, (1900) 177 U. S. 655, 20 Sup. Ct.
8o3; The Benito Estenger, (19oo) 176 U. S. 568, 20 Sup. Ct. 489;
The Pedro, (1899) 175 U. S. 354, 20 Sup. Ct. I38; and see his dis-
senting opinions in Dewey v. United States, (19oo) 178 U. S. 510, 20
Sup. Ct. !81; The Paquete Habana, (19oo) 175 U. S. 677, 20 Sup.
Ct. 290.
'United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) 156 U. S. 1, I5 Sup. Ct.
249; Loewe v. Lawlor, (198o) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301.
* See, for example, Robertson v. Rosenthal, (1889) 132 U. S. 46o, 1o
Sup. Ct. 120, on the question whether hair-pins were pins within
the meaning of the tariff act.
* See, for example, Virginia v. West Virginia, (I9O7) 2o6 U. S. 290,
27 Sup. Ct. 732, (1908) 209 U. S. 514, 28 Sup. Ct. 614; Louisiana v.
Mississippi, (19o6) 202 U. S. i, 26 Sup. 408; Kansas v. Colorado,
(I92) I85 U. S. 125, 22 Sup. Ct. 552; and also Louisiana v. Texas,
(i9oo) 176 U. S. I, 20 Sup. Ct. 251, where the court decided that there
was no controversy between the states; Missouri v. Illinois, (1901)
18o U. S. 208, 21 Sup. Ct. 331, where the Chief Justice dissented;
South Dakota v. North Carolina, (1.o4) 192 U. S. 286, 24 Sup. Ct.
269, where he was one of the dissenting justices. See also Kansas
v. United States, (9o7) 204 U. S. 331, 27 Sup. Ct. 388, as to suit by
state against United States.
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cases in the decision of which Chief Justice Fuller took an
active part it is impossible in this brief article to refer to
more than a few of the most important.
He prepared the opinions of the court in the Income Tax
Case, 10 the Original Package Case," the Sugar Trust
Case' 2 and the Danbury Hatters' Case;13 and he prepared
dissenting opinions in the most important of the Insular
Cases' 4 and in the Lottery Case. 15
In the Income Tax Case the court construed the provision
of the Constitution that Congress may not lay any direct
tax unless in proportion to the population and decided, by
a vote of five to four, that a tax upon the income from real
or personal property was a direct tax, that a federal law
which taxed such income otherwise than in proportion to
the population was in that respect unconstitutional, and that,
as the court believed that Congress would not have taxed in-
comes from other sources if it knew that a tax upon income
from real or personal property would be declared unconsti-
tutional, all that part of the law of 1894 which related to
taxes upon incomes must be regarded as void.
In the Original Package Case the court decided, by a
vote of six to three, that, in view of the provision of the
Constitution which authorizes Congress to regulate inter-
state commerce, a law of Iowa which prohibited the sale of
"Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., (1895) 157 U. S. 429, 158
U. S. 6oi, I5 Sup. Ct. 673, 912.
'Leisy v. Hardin, (i89o) 135 U. S. IoO, 1O Sup. Ct. 681. See also
Lyng v. Michigan, (189o) 135 U. S. I61, IO Sup. Ct. 725.
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., (1895) I56 U. S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct.
249.
"Loewe v. Lawlor, (igo8) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301.
"4Downes v. Bidwell, (igoi) 182 U. S. 244, 21 Sup. Ct. 770; Dooley
v. United States, (19O1) 183 U. S. 151, 22 Sup. Ct. 62; Hawaii v. Man-
kichi, (1903) 190 U. S. 197, 23 Sup. Ct. 787. Justices Harlan, Brewer
and Peckham concurred in these dissenting opinions. They also
concurred in the opinion which he prepared in the Diamond Rings
Case, (9O) 183 U. S. 176, 22 Sup. Ct. 59. Justice Brown prepared
a separate opinion in that case, and four justices dissented.
" (1qo3) I88 U. S. 321, 23 Sup. Ct. 321.
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intoxicating liquors could not constitutionally be enforced
against one who brought liquor from another state and of-
fered it for sale in the package in which it was brought into
the state. In order to reach this decision it was necessary
for the court to declare that the case of Peirce v. New
Hampshire'- was overruled, and the decision was reached
in spite of the contention of the dissenting justices that the
purpose of the statute furnished sufficient ground for hold-
ing that the statute was enforceable against all dealers in
intoxicating liquors, certainly in the absence of conflicting
'federal legislation, and possibly regardless of any conflict-
ing federal legislation.
There might also have been made the more sweeping
criticism that the court did not show, and never has shown,
any sufficient reason for saying that in any respect Congress
is granted more than paramount power over commerce. It
is true that when Congress exercises a power which has
actually been granted to it that legislation excludes the exer-
cise of any state power: the states have no concurrent power
which enables them to pass laws which are inconsistent with
federal legislation based upon the Constitution. 17 But the
court has never shown any satisfactory reason for saying
that state legislation which directly regulates what is un-
questionably interstate commerce but which does not con-
flict with federal legislation upon that subject is unconstitu-
tional. Those who adopted the Constitution were careful to
provide that several designated powers which were granted
to Congress might not be exercised by the states even in the
absence of federal action; and in view of those express pro-
hibitions the fact that there is no such provision concerning
the power which Congress may exercise by virtue of the
commerce clause seems to show clearly that even when state
19 (1847) 5 How. 504.
"United States Constitution, Article V1, section 2.
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legislation regulates interstate commerce if it does not con-
flict with federal legislation it ought to be held constitutional.
Upon the announcement of the decision in the Original
Package Case Congress promptly passed the Wilson Act,
which provided that intoxicating liquors which were taken
into any state should upon arrival be subject to laws enacted
in the exercise of the police powers of the state to the same
extent as were such liquors produced in that state, and the
court in the case of In re Rahrer'8 in an opinion by Chief
Justice Fuller declared that that act was constitutional and
that it validated state laws which had been passed prior to
the enactment of the federal law. In later cases the court
has declared unconstitutional several state regulations con-
cerning the carrying of intoxicating liquors into the state ;9
while in other cases the court has declared that, in view of
the Wilson Act, state statutes relating to the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors even when brought from without the state
were constitutional.20 The Chief Justice dissented in every
one of those later cases in which prohibitory legislation was
held valid.
There have also been cases involving the question as to
what were original packages of merchandise and in most
of those cases he was one of the justices who dissented, de-
claring that articles were in original packages within the
" (1891) 140 U. S. 545, II Sup. Ct. 865.
"Scott v. Donald, (1897) 165 U. S. 58, 17 Sup. Ct. 265; Rhodes v.
Iowa, (1898) 170 U. S. 412, 18 Sup. Ct. 664; Vance v. W. A. Vander-
cook Co., (1898) 170 U. S. 438, 18 Sup. Ct. 674; American Express Co.
v. Iowa, (igo5) 196 U. S. 133, 25 Sup. Ct. 182; Adams Express Co. v.
Iowa, (9o5) 196 U. S. 147, 25 Sup. Ct. 185; Heyman v. Southern Ry.
Co., (19o6) 203 U. S. 270, 27 Sup. Ct. 1O4. The opinion was by Justice
White in every case except Scott v. Donald, where it was by Justice
Shiras.
Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., (1898) 170 U. S. 438, 18 Sup.
Ct. 674; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, (1905) 198 U. S. 17, 25
Sup. Ct. 552; Delamater v. South Dakota, (1907) 205 U. S. 93, 27 Sup.
Ct. 447. See also Foppiano v. Speed, (19o5) 199 U. S. 501, 26 Sup.
Ct 138, where a license law was held constitutional. The opinions in
the three first cases were by Justice White. The opinion in Foppiano
v. Speed was by Justice Peckham.
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meaning of the rule although the majority of the court
decided otherwise.
21
The Chief Justice also dissented when the court decided
that a law of Georgia which greatly restricted the running
on Sunday of all freight trains within that state did not vio-
late the commerce clause.22  But, on the other hand, he
delivered opinions sustaining a state inspection law2 3 and a
state law imposing on railroad companies a penalty for
failure to pay promptly claims for loss or damage arising
out of freight transportation ;24 and he dissented when the
court held that the commerce clause invalidated a state law
which required the furnishing of freight cars regardless of
any excuses except "in cases of strikes or other public
calamity." 25  And while, in a case in which counsel con-
ceded that such a result was necessary if previous decisions
were to be followed, he announced the decision of the court
that a state law which imposed a tax upon telegraph compa-
'May v. New Orleans, (igoo) 178 U. S. 496, 20 Sup. Ct. 976, Chief
Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer, Shiras and Peckham dissenting;
Austin v. Tennessee, (igoo) 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. 132, Justice
White concurring and Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer,
Shiras and Peckham dissenting; Cook v. Marshall County, (19o5) 196
U. S. 261, 25 Sup. Ct. 233, Justice White concurring and Chief Jus-
tice Fuller and Justices Brewer and Peckham dissenting. See also
Plumley v. Massachusetts, (1894) 155 U. S. 461, 15 Sup. Ct. x5, in
which the Chief Justice and Justices Field and Brewer dissented;
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, (1898) 71 U. S. I, 18 Sup. Ct. 757;
Collins v. New Hampshire, (1898) 171 U. S. 30, 18 Sup. Ct. 768, two
cases in which state laws relating to oleomargarine were declared un-
constitutional, Justices Gray and Harlan alone dissenting; and Cross-
inan v. Lurman, (i9o4) 192 U. S. 189, 24 Sup. Ct 234, In which there
was no dissent.-For further discussion of the original package ques-
tion see Cooke, 'The Commerce Clause, pp. 27, 161, 253; Howland, The
Police Power and Interstate Commerce, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 221; Trickett,
The Original Package Ineptitude, 6 Col. L. Rev. 161.
=Hennington, v. Georgia, (1896) 163 U. S. 299, 16 Sup. Ct. io86.
=Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, (I898) 17 U. S. 345, 18
Sup. Ct. 862.
I-Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Mazursky, (1910) 216 U. S. 122, 30 SUp.
Ct. 378.
"Houston, & T. C. R. Co. v. Mayes, (19o6) 201 U. S. 32r, 26 Sup.
Ct. 491.
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nies was unconstitutional in part,2 6 yet in every other case
which involved the question whether a state tax law violated
the commerce clause and in which he delivered the opinion
of the court the state law was sustained, 27 and in every case
which involved such a question and in which he dissented
the court had against his dissent declared that the state leg-
islation was unconstitutional.
28
Moreover, in the Lottery Case29 he took the position that
the commerce clause did not bestow upon Congress as much
power as Congress had sought to exercise. When the court
sustained the federal statute which prohibited the interstate
transportation of material directly relating to lotteries, even
though the transportation was not by mail,30 he filed a vig-
orous dissenting opinion, in which three other justices con-
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (1888) 128 U. S. 39, 9
Sup. Ct. 6. This was the first opinion delivered by him.
T MFicklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., (1892) 145 U. S. I, 12 Sup.
Ct. 81o; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, (1895) 155 U. S. 688, 15
Sup. Ct. 268, 36o; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, (1897)
165 U. S. 194, sub nom. Sanford v. Poe, 17 Sup. Ct. 305; Adams Ex-
press Co. v. Kentucky, (1897) 166 U. S. 171, sub nora. Weir v. Norman,
17 Sup. Ct. 527; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, (1897) 166 U. S.
150, 17 Sup. Ct. 532; Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Illinois, (igoo)
175 U. S. 626, 2o Sup. Ct. 205; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Lynch, (igoo) 177 U. S. 149, 20 Sup. Ct. 631; Williams v. Fears,
(19OO) 179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct. 128; Western Union Tel. Co. v. New
Hope, (1903) 187 U. S. 419, 23 Sup. Ct. 204. And in Maine v. Grand
T. Ry. Co., (1891) 142 U. S. 217, 12 Sup. Ct. 121, 163, he agreed with
the decision sustaining the state statute although four justices dis-
sented.
'McCall v. California, (189o) 136 U. S. io4, IO Sup. Ct. 881; Nor-
folk & W. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, (i8go) 136 U. S. 114, 1O Sup. Ct.
958; Crutcher v. Kentucky, (189I) 141 U. S. 47, Ii Sup. Ct 851;
Fargo v. Hart, (1904) 193 U. S. 490, 24 Sup. Ct. 498; Galveston, H.
& S. A. Ry. Co. v. Texas, (19o8) 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 638;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, (igio) 216 U. S. I, 30 Sup. Ct.
i90; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, (191o) 216 U. S. 56, 30 Sup. Ct. 232; Lud-
wig v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1900) 216 U. S. 146, 3o Sup. Ct. 28o.
(19o3) 188 U. S. 321, 23 SUp. Ct. 321.
"In Ex parte Rapier, (1892) 143 U. S. 110, 12 Sup. Ct. 374, the court
in an opinion by the Chief Justice declared that Congress may ex-
clude lottery matter from the mails. That power does not rest on the
commerce clause but on the grant to Congress of power over the post-
office tystem.
CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER
curred.3 1 And when in the Northern Securities Case3 2 the
court held that in view of the Anti-Trust Act a corporation
might not lawfully be organized under a state charter to
hold a majority of the stock of each of two railroad compa-
nies which were incorporated under state charters and which
had been competing for contracts for interstate transporta-
tion, the Chief Justice was one of four dissentients who
declared, in opinions by Justices White and Holmes, not
only that Congress had not intended to interfere with such
acquisition and ownership, but also that the commerce clause
did not empower Congress to prevent such acquisition and
ownership.
In the Insular Cases,33 when the court decided that in
part of the territory which is subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States the provisions which were placed in the
Federal Constitution as restraints upon the federal govern-
ment do not ipso facto restrain that government, the Chief
Justice prepared several able dissenting opinions.
3 4
He wrote the opinion in Boyd v. Thayer"5 in which the
court with doubtful propriety86 considered the title to the
governorship of Nebraska and reversed the judgment of the
supreme court of the state that Boyd was not the lawful
incumbent of that office; and, on the other hand, in the later
case of Taylor and Marshall v. BeckhanZ3 7 he wrote the
' See also Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, (i889) 129 U. S. 141, 9 Sup.
Ct. 256, where he delivered the opinion, on the power which was
granted to Congress by the commerce clause.
' Northern Securities Co. v. United States, (i9o4) 193 U. S. 197, 24
Sup. Ct. 436.
"See note 14, supra.
"' See also his dissenting opinion in Mormon Church v. United States,
(i8oo) 136 U. S. I, Io Sup. Ct. 792. The Insular Cases are discussed
in Patterson, The United States and the States Under the Constitu-
tion, 2d ed., sec. 8.
" (1892) 143 U. S. 135, 12 Sup. Ct. 375.
"See the dissenting opinion of Justice Field. Reference should also
be made to the discussion of the decision in 26 Am. L. Rev. 278, al-
though the language there used is open to objection.
"(19oo) 178 U. S. 548, 20 Sup. Ct. 89o.
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opinion in which the court declined to consider the title to
the governorship of Kentucky.
In Atkin v. Kansas,38 when the court decided that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not in-
validate a state law which provided that no one undertaking
work for it or for one of its municipal agencies should per-
mit or require an employee on such work to labor more than
eight hours each day, the Chief Justice dissented, together
with Justices Brewer and Peckham. The dissentients gave
no reason for their position, and the opinion of the court
seems to be unanswerable. In Lochner v. New York,3 9
when the court, by a vote of five to four, declared that the
law of New York which limited the hours of labor of
bakers to ten hours each day was in violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Chief
Justice approved of the decision. 40 And in Adair v. United
States,41 when it was decided, by a vote of six to two, that
the federal statute which made it unlawful for an agent of
an interstate carrier to discharge an employee of such carrier
because of membership in a labor organization was not au-
thorized by the commerce clause and was forbidden by the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, he sided with
the majority.
But, on the other hand, he wrote the opinion42 in which
the federal coupler law was so interpreted as to furnish the
protection to railroad employees which was intended by
Congress, and when so interpreted was held to be constitu-
tional. He also prepared opinions in several cases, in which
the federal courts acquired jurisdiction by reason of the
S' (1903) 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124.
" (195o) I98 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539.
" See article in the U. of Pa. L. Rev. for Jan., 1g1o, on the bear-
ing of the due process clauses on substantive law.
' (19o8) 208 U. S. I61, 28 Sup. Ct. 277.
"*Johnson v. Southern Pacific Co., (19o4) 196 U. S. I, 25 Sup. Ct.
158.
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diverse citizenship of the parties, in which railroad em-
ployees claimed damages from their employers for injuries
arising out of defects in the roadbed or machinery, and in
every case the decision was in favor of the employee.4 3 He
wrote the opinion of the court in one case in which a railroad
employee was injured through the negligence of a fellow
employee and in which the decision was in favor of the
plaintiff ;44 and in a number of railroad cases in which inju-
ries to employees were caused by persons who were said to
be co-employees and in which the decision was in favor of
the railroad company, the Chief Justice dissented.45 He
does not appear to have prepared an opinion in favor of the
defendant in a single case in which the fellow-servant rule
was invoked.
46
Reference has already been made to the fact that he was
one of the justices who dissented from the decision in the
Northern Securities Case.47 In the earlier case of United
States v. E. C. Knight Co.48 he had prepared the opinion in
which the court had declared that, where a combination of
companies which refined nearly all of the sugar which was
"Gardner v. Michigan C. R. Co., (1893) 150 U. S. 349, 14 Sup. Ct.
140; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Snyder, (1894) 152 U. S. 684, 14 Sup. Ct.
756; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, (1896) 16i U. S. 451, 16 Sup. Ct.
618; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Barrett, (897) 166 U. S. 617, 17 Sup. Ct.
707; and see Dunlap v. Northeastern R. Co., (1889) 13o U. S. 649, 9
Sup. Ct. 647.
"Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Pontius, (1895) 157 U. S. 209, 15
Sup. Ct. 585.
'Baltimore & 0. R. Co, v. Baugh, (1893) 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct.
914; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Hambly, (1894) 154 U. S. 349, 14 Sup. Ct.
983; Central R. Co. of N. J. v. Keegan, (1895) i6o U. S. 259, 16 Sup.
Ct. 269; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Peterson, (1896) 162 U. S. 346, 16 Sup.
Ct. 843; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Charless, (1896) 162 U. S. 359, 16
Sup. Ct. 848; Northert Pac. R. Co. v. Dixon, (1904) 194 U. S. 338,
24 Sup. Ct. 683.
"'For other accident cases see Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Harris, (I895)
158 U. S. 326, 15 Sup. Ct. 843; Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Griffith, (I895)
159 U. S. 6o3, 16 Sup. Ct. 1O5; Northern P. R. Co. v. Freeman, (1899)
174 U. S. 379, I9 Sup. Ct. 763, in the last of which he dissented.
'See page 9, supra.
" (1895) 156 U. S. I, I5 Sup. Ct. 249:
- I I
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refined in the United States was wrought by exchanges of
shares of stock of the American Sugar Refining Company
for shares of stock of competing companies, the Anti-Trust
Act did not authorize the federal courts to order the return
of the shares of stock of the respective companies by their
then holders to their former owners. And in the case of
Loewe v. Lawlor"0 he prepared the opinion in which the
court declared unanimously that the Anti-Trust Act ren-
dered illegal a combination of consumers to boycott the
products of a particular factory and thus prevent, as far as
possible, any traffic in those products. The traffic was
mainly interstate.
In this brief summary we have noted only a few of the
cases before the court in the decision of which the Chief
Justice took an important part. Reference might also be
made to hundreds of other cases, for the court must have
decided some eight or ten thousand cases during his Chief
Justiceship. But, of course, a thorough discussion of his
judicial record is not attempted.
We must, however, note in conclusion one further fact
which is interesting in view of the number of vacancies
upon the bench which will be filled by President Taft and
the Senate and the many statements which have been made
concerning the political importance of those appointments.
Since the decision in Field v. Clark50 more than eighteen
years ago, there has been but one case before the Supreme
Court which involved a question of constitutional law and
in which all of the Republican members of the court took
one position and all of the Democratic members of the court
(19o8) 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct 301.
" (1892) 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct 495. On the question of delega-
tion of legislative power see U. of Pa. L. Rev., Nov., igo8, p. 6g.
Prior to that decision see In re Neagle, (I8go) i35 U. S. 1, io Sup. Ct.
658; United States v. Texas, (1892) 143 U. S. 621, 12 Sup. Ct. 488.
And see Handley v. Stutz, (i8gi) 139 U. S. 417, 1i Sup. Ct. 530, which
related simply to corporation law.
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took a contrary position. The question in that case5 1 was
whether a federal inheritance tax which was collected while
the property was in the hands of the executor could constitu-
tionally be applied to a bequest to a municipality for public
purposes. The court upheld the tax against the dissents of
the Chief Justice and of Justices White and Peckham. This
decision will not be of much practical importance until the
people of the United States have become far more eager to
make bequests to municipalities than they are to-day.
There was only one other case during those eighteen years
in which all of the Republican members of the court ap-
proved of the decision and all of the Democratic members
disapproved. That was an appeal from the Court of
Claims, 5 2 and neither of the two dissenting justices5 3 filed
an opinion.
There have been but two other decisions within that
period in which the members of the court have divided
almost upon party lines. In Muhlker v. Harlem R. Co.,
5 4
where it was urged that the decision of the state court vio-
lated the contract clause of the Constitution and the Four-
teenth Amendment, and that decision was reversed, the
Chief Justice and Justices White, Peckham and Holmes dis-
sented in an opinion by Justice Holmes. And in the North-
ern Securities Case5 5 the same justices dissented.
The case last cited is the only one of the four cases just
referred to which aroused a widespread public interest, and
it would be going far to say that the justices who dissented
from that decision were expressing the views of the Demo-
cratic party. Indeed, an examination of the decisions dur-
ing the entire period in which Mr. Fuller was Chief justice
"Snyder v. Bettman, (193) 19o U. S. 249, 23 Sup. Ct. 803.
"United States v. Shea, (1894) 152 U. S. 178, 14 Sup. Ct. 519.
'The Chief Justice and Justice Jackson.
" (905) i97 U. S. 544, 25 Sup. Ct. 522.
'Northern Securities Co. v. United States, (19o4) 193 U. S. 197, 24
Sup. Ct. 436.
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shows conclusively that party lines had but little bearing
upon the decisions of the Supreme Court. It is true that
men of widely divergent views call themselves by the same
party name, and this fact may help to account for the
absence of any appearance of partisanship in the decisions.
But it is also true that there is no excuse for the existence
of partisan feeling among the justices. The duty of the
court, especially when dealing with the Constitution, is
simply to interpret and in interpreting to show clearly the
connection between its conclusion and the words of the Con-
stitution or law upon which the conclusion is said to be
based. When this is done there is but little room for parti-
san feeling. When it is not done, however desirable the
conclusion may be, the opinion of the court, and perhaps its
judgment, deserves serious criticism.
Robert P. Reeder.
